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Introduction
Reputation—how we are seen in the eyes of others—is a 
social construct, used to predict how others might act in 
the future (Leimgruber et al. 2012). Reputation concerns 
are widespread in typical individuals: they donate more to 
charity when observed (Izuma et al. 2010, 2011), behave in 
more prosocial ways when a pair of eyes are present (Bate-
son et al. 2013, 2006) and strive to keep up appearances on 
the Internet (Tennie et al. 2010). From an evolutionary per-
spective, reputation is valuable for cooperation: individuals 
with a reputation for being cooperative are more likely to be 
selected as partners in the future (Barclay and Willer 2007; 
Sylwester and Roberts 2010; Tomasello et al. 2012; Tom-
sello and Vaish 2013).
Less is known, however, about reputation manage-
ment—the efforts made to maintain or obtain a certain 
reputation—in those with autism. Autism is a pervasive 
neurodevelopmental condition that affects the way autistic 
individuals experience the world around them. In particular, 
autistic1 individuals struggle with social aspects of everyday 
life (American Psychiatric Association (APA) 2013) includ-
ing problems with making friends (Petrina et al. 2014) and 
understanding others’ thoughts (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; 
T ger-Flusberg 2007). It could be argued that, given these 
1 The term ‘autistic person’ is the preferred language of many people 
on the spectrum (e.g. Kenny et al. 2015; Sinclair1999). In his article, 
we use this t rm as well as person-first l nguage to respect the wishes 
of all individuals on the spectrum (Kenny et al. 2015).
Abstract Being able to manage reputation is an impor-
tant social skill, but it is unclear whether autis ic child en 
can manage reputation. This study investigated whether 
33 autistic children matched to 33 typical children could 
implicitly or explicitly manage reputation. Further, we 
examined whether cognitive processes—theory of mind, 
social motivation, inhibitory control and reciprocity—con-
tribute to reputation managemen . Results showed that 
neither group implicitly managed reputation, and the  
was no group difference in explicit reputation manage-
ment. Results suggested different mechanisms contribute 
to reputation management in these groups— ocial moti a-
tion in typical children and recipr ty in autistic ch ldren. 
Explicit reputation management is achievable for autistic 
children, and there are individual differ ces in its relation-
ship to underlying cognitive proc sses.
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which report a reduced propensity to implicitly manage 
reputation (Izuma et al. 2011) but an intact, albeit reduced, 
ability to do so when reputation was more explicitly at risk 
(Cage et al. 2013). The current study tested both implicit 
and explicit reputation management within the same group 
of children with autism and a matched group of typical chil-
dren. To measure implicit reputation management, children 
completed one-shot dictator games once when observed and 
once when unobserved. We utilised the dictator game since 
it is thought to have good reliability (Thomae et al. 2012) 
and to be an excellent experimental means for testing social 
behaviour (Camerer and Fehr 2002). To measu e explicit 
reputation management, children were given the opportu-
nity to protect their reputation following allegedly poor per-
formance in a game.
It is important to enhance our understanding of whether 
autistic children can be concerned for their reputation under 
different circumstances. If autistic children can show some 
concern for their reputation and an understanding of how 
to manage it, this would have implications for our under-
standing of social behaviour and social capacity in autism, 
and the potential for an ability which has previously been 
claimed not to be possible in autism (e.g. Chevallier et al. 
2012b; Izuma et al. 2011).
Individual Differences in Reputation Management
Recent research has shown, however, that reputation man-
agement is possible in some adolescents and adults on the 
autism spectrum (Cage et al. 2013,2016; Scheeren et al. 
2015), which raises questions about the underlying abilities 
that might explain variability in explicit and implicit reputa-
tion management in autistic individuals. Two main hypoth-
eses have been proposed to explain why autistic individuals 
have difficulties with reputation management. The first, 
the Theory of Mind (ToM) hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et al. 
1985; Izuma et al. 2011), claims that autistic individuals’ 
social-cognitive difficulties are caused by a lack of ToM, 
the ability to interpret the thoughts and beliefs of others and 
the self (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). If autistic children have 
difficulty in representing other minds, they would be unable 
to represent how they are viewed in the eyes of others, and 
thus be incapable of reputation management (Izuma et al. 
2011). However, children with autism do not categorically 
fail ToM tests, although this may be dependent on verbal 
ability and age (Scheeren et al. 2013) and the use of alterna-
tive strategies (Begeer et al. 2010; Lind and Bowler2009).
Thus, individual differences in ToM ability may contribute 
to the extent to which autistic children manage reputation.
A second explanation for reduced reputation manage-
ment is that autistic individuals are not socially moti-
vated, which leads to difficulties in developing appropriate 
pervasive social difficulties, autistic children would be 
unable to manage their reputation.
However, there is mixed evidence as to whether children 
with autism are concerned about their reputation. Cheval-
lier, Molesworth and Happé (2012b) tested whether children 
with autism would flatter when informed that a drawing 
they had previously seen had been dr wn by the expe i-
menter. While typical children increased t eir ra ing of this 
drawing, purportedly to manage reputati n, autistic children 
did not. Chevallier et al. (2012b) nterpreted h res lt as 
evidence for a lack of reputati n managem nt in autism. 
Research into self-presentational skills, however, suggests 
that autistic children may have some preserved reputatio
management ability. Self-presen ation (or ‘explicit reputa
tion management’) is the ability to deliberately present one-
self in a certain light (Banaji and Pren ice1994). In egeer
et al.’s (2008) tudy, autistic and typ cal children could win 
a prize by describing why they deserved to win the prize. 
Like typical children, autistic children used more p si-
tive self-statements compared to when they were asked to 
describe themselves. However, ch ldren with autism were
less strategic in their self-descriptions. These findings were 
replicated by Scheeren, Begeer, Banerjee, Meerum Terwogt 
and Koot (2010), who also noted that children with autism 
found it harder to target their self-descriptions to specific 
audiences. Scheeren et al. (2010) suggested that autistic 
children may be less skilled at self-presentation due to a 
reduced propensity to exaggerate or make up facts to gain 
prizes. However, Scheeren et al. (2015) subsequ ntly found 
no difference between autistic a d typical children in strate-
gic self-presentation.
It seems plausible from self-presentation research (B r-
baro and Dissanayake 2007; Begeer et al. 2008; Scheeren 
et al. 2010, 2015) that autistic childre y be able to man-
age their reputation when th re is an i centive to do so. 
One possible reputational incent ve for autistic children is 
friendships. Autistic children do desire friendships (Baum-
inger et al. 2003; C der et al. 2013; Daniel and Billings-
ley 2010; Locke et al. 2010); however their friendship  are 
often qualitatively different from hose of ty ical children: 
in a review of 24 studies, Petrina et l. (2014) noted hat 
autistic children perceive  lowe  levels of c mpanionship, 
intimacy and closeness compared to their typical pe rs. Fur-
ther, there is great variation in the extent to which autistic 
children want social contact—while some report anting 
many friends, others prefer to be alone (Calder et al. 2013). 
Autistic children who want to have friends may be more 
likely to consider their reputation.
Overall, these findings suggest that children with autism 
do not implicitly or au omatically man ge their reputatio  
(Chevallier et al. 2012b), but that the ability o explicitlyor 
consciously do o may be preserved (Scheeren et al. 2015). 
This suggestion corroborates res arch with autist c adults, 
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The relationships between inhibitory control, reciproc-
ity and reputation management have not previously been 
examined in autistic children, and these factors in addition 
to social motivation and theory of mind were assessed to 
determine the extent, if any, they were related individual 
differences in implicit and explicit reputation management.
Method
Participants
Sixty-six cognitively-able children aged from 7 to 14 years 
took part in the current study (Table 1). Typical children 
(n = 33) were matched to autistic children (n =33) on chron-
ological age, t(64) =1.42, p = .16, r = .17, and verbal mental 
age, t(64) = 0.37, p= .71, r= .05. Children were matched 
on verbal mental age, as measured by the Wechsler Abbre-
viated Scales of Intelligence—Second edition (WASI-II; 
Wechsler 2011), since language ability was required for 
many of the tasks. An additional six autistic children whose 
verbal mental age was more than 3 years lower than their 
chronological age were excluded from the sample. This cut-
off was used since none of the typical children showed a 
discrepancy between chronological and verbal mental age 
of this magnitude. Although the typical group had a higher 
social-cognitive skills—including being able to manage 
reputation (Chevallier et al. 2012, b). Yet, social motiva-
tion is not completely abs nt in those on the autism spec-
trum: many report a need for friendships (B umi ger e  al. 
2003; Calder et al. 2013; Locke et al. 2010) and desire to fit 
in with others (Carrington et al. 2003a, b; Daniel an  Bi l-
ingsley 2010; Portway and Johnson 2003). It is possible that 
individual variation in social motivation could contribute to 
autistic children’s tendency to manage reputation.
Two novel accounts of reputation management were also 
examined in the current study: reciprocity and inhibitory 
control. Reciprocity is a behavioural response contingent 
on another’s actions (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Typical 
individuals highly value reciproci y (Kahn man 2003), with 
those who are more reciprocal se n as mor  co perative and 
with a better reputation (H ffman et al1998; M linski et 
al. 2002; Molleman et al. 2013; Now k et al. 2005). Under-
standing the principles of reciprocity and having expecta-
tions that others will reciprocate with you could underlie the 
ability to manage reputation. A ack of social reciprocity is 
a hallmark feature of autism, with autistic individuals dem-
onstrating a reduced number of ppropriate reciprocal social 
responses such as conversational turn-taking (APA 2013). 
Expectations of reciprocity rom oth rs are likely based 
on experiences of reciprocity (Hoffman et al. 1994, 1996, 
2008). In terms of social experience , typ cal children often 
do not tend to reciprocate autistic children’s friendships 
(Rotheram-Fuller et al. 2010) and m y frequently neglect 
and ignore autistic children in the playground (Kasari et al. 
2011). These experiences may lend themselves to a reduced 
expectation of reciprocity in autistic children, which has 
previously been noted in autistic adults (Cage et al. 2013).
The second unexamined factor that may contribute to 
variability in reputation management in autism is inhibitory 
control. Reputation management, by definition, requires 
strategic control of behaviour in order to further one’s rep-
utation. Thus, on occasion, reputation management may 
require the inhibition of behaviours likely to impact nega-
tively upon one’s reputation and the selection of behaviours 
with a more positive impact (Von Hippel and Gonsalkorale 
2005). In support of the proposed link between reputation 
management and response inhibition are findings demon-
strating that inhibitory control is an important predictor of 
social-emotional competence: for example, children with 
better inhibition skills are rated as more socially skilled 
(Rhoades et al. 2009) and show fewer externalizing behav-
iour problems in later childhood (Olson et al. 1999). There 
is mixed evidence as to whether children with autism have 
difficulties with inhibition (Christ et al. 2007; Corbett et al. 
2009; Hill 2004b) making this a worthy topic of investiga-
tion. Accordingly, individual differences in inhibitory con-
trol in autism could contribute to variability in reputation 
management.
Table 1 D scriptive statistics for chronological age, verbal mental 
age, social communication questionnaire (SCQ) score and autism 
diagnos ic observation schedule—2nd edition (ADOS-2) scores
Group p value
TypicalAutism
N 33 33
Gender (M:F) 21:12 27:6 0.097
Chronological age (in years)
M (SD) 10.24 (2.00)1 .96 (2.11)0.16
Range 6.92–14.217.18–14.32
Verbal menta  age (in ye rs)
M (SD) 10.52 (2.28)10.31 (2.35)0.71
Range 5.74–14.506.15–15.31
SCQ
M (SD) 4.67 (3.63)23.88 (6.62)<0.001
Range 0–14 11–38
ADOS overall score
M (SD) – 10.62 (3.33)
Range – 7–19
Verbal mental age calculated by dividing chronological age by 100 
and multiplying this by verbal IQ score as measured by the WASI-II 
(Wechsler 2011). Cut off scores for the SCQ and ADOS are 15 and 7 
respectively, with higher scores reflecting greater autism symptom-
atology
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were presented on 13″ Windows 7 Toshiba Portege laptops 
using MATLAB (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) 
and Cogent toolbox (LON, FIL, & ICN, London, UK).
Implicit Reputation Management Task
This measure taps implicit reputation management by test-
ing whether children are affected by the presence of an 
observer, by increasing the number of points given in the 
observed condition in order to appear more generous. In 
this task, children completed 20 one-shot dictator games: 
10 when observed and 10 when unobserved. Children were 
instructed that they were going to play a decision making 
game: “You are going to meet some of the other players in 
Verden. Each time you meet a new player, you will get 10 
points. You can give him or her some or all of these points 
and you keep the rest”. They were then asked, “How much 
do you want to give [name of other player]?” The number 
of points (between 0 and 10) was inputted using the key-
board (Fig. 1).
All children completed this task under two conditions: 
once unobserved and once whilst observed by another child. 
The other child was tested separately and concurrently on the 
same tasks with a second experimenter. To justify why the 
children needed to observe one another, an “error” occurred 
on one of the children’s laptops. The children then came 
together to complete the task on the “working” laptop. Once 
one child had completed the task observed, they exchanged 
places so that the other child could complete 10 observed 
trials. To ensure observation, the observing child was asked 
to write down the participating child’s responses. Once 
both had observed each other, the experimenter returned 
and claimed the broken laptop was fixed. If the unobserved 
condition was first, they moved on to the next task. If the 
observed condition was first, they completed the task again 
unobserved. The order of observed and unobserved condi-
tions was counterbalanced across children. The dependent 
variable was the observer effect, obtained by calculating 
the difference score between observed and unobserved 
conditions.
proportion of girls than th au ism gr up, chi square con-
firmed that this difference was not significant, χ²(1) = 2.75, 
p = .097, φ =0.20.
Typical children were recruited through schools and extra-
curricular clubs in the greater London are . Autistic children 
were recruited through autism resource provisions attached 
to mainstream schools in London and community contac s. 
All autistic children had an independent c inical di gnosis 
of an autism spectrum condition (ASC) and scored above 
the cut-off scores of 7 for an ASC on the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule—2nd edit on (ADOS-2; Lord et al. 
2000) and of 15 on the Social Communication Question-
naire (SCQ) (Rutter et al. 2003). One chi d with autism fell 
below the cut-off on the SCQ but was tained in analyses 
since he had a clinical diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrom , 
met criteria on the ADOS, and his removal from the sample 
did not alter the results. Parents of typical (n = 27) children 
also completed the SCQ (Rutter et al. 2003); none show d
elevated levels of autistic symptomatology.
All procedures performed in this study were in accor-
dance with the ethical standards of the first and third author’s 
institutional research committee and with the 1964 H lsinki 
declaration and its later am ndments or comparabl  ethical 
standards. Informed written consent was obtained from all 
parents and verbal consent from children included in the 
study.
Design
The current study had a between-participants design, with 
the independent variable of group (autism or typical). The 
dependent variables for the explicit and impli it asks, as
well as the four proposed mechanisms, are outlined below.
Materials and Procedure
All of the tasks took place within the context of an online 
gaming world called “Verden”. This context provided an 
overarching theme for the research that was developm n-
tally appropriate for children aged 7 to 14 years. All tasks 
Fig. 1 Example of a single trial 
from the implicit reputation 
task, in which children are first 
asked how many points they 
would like to share with the 
other player. After making their 
choice, the allocated points to 
the other and to the self were 
shown on-screen
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Social Motivation
Social motivation was measured in two ways. In the first, 
ecologically-valid way, children were told that their assis-
tance was required to test some new games in Verden. 
Critically, they had the choice of playing a two-player game 
(with the other child or the experimenter) or a one-player 
game (on their own).The dependent variable was the binary 
choice of playing with someone or playing alone.
Second, social motivation was measured using Rich-
ard and Schneider’s (2005) Fri nd hip Motivation Ques-
tionnaire, which quantified children’s desire to be social 
through their motivation to have friends. Children were 
asked to think about why they wanted to have friends. They 
viewed 12 statements pertaining to the motivations for hav-
ing friends; such as “to be invited to parties”, and “because 
it makes me feel better when I’m sad”. Children rated each 
statement on a 4-point scale by deciding how much the 
statement sounded like them from not at all like me (score 
of ‘1’) to exactly like me (score of ‘4’). A friendship motiva-
tion score was calculated by summing the responses on the 
scale. Higher scores indicate higher motivation for friend-
ships (maximum score = 48).
Reciprocity: Baseline (Predictions of Generosity)
This task was designed to provide a baseline measure of 
children’s predictions of generosity from others. As with 
the implicit reputation management task, children were told 
that they were playing decision-making games. First, they 
had to decide how many points to give the other player at 
the exact same time a  the other player decided how many 
points to give to them (Fig. 3a). Thus, there was no recip-
rocal element. After deciding how many points to give to 
the other player, children could next obtain ‘b nus points’ 
for guessing how many points the other would give them. 
No feedback was given regarding whether they had guessed 
correctly, but all children received a fixed amount of ‘bonus 
points’ at the end in order to ensure they stayed motivated 
Explicit Reputation Management Task
This task was designed to give ch ldr n the opportunity to 
prevent others knowing about poor performance in a game 
and to protect their reputation. This task was designed to
have lower verbal demands than previous tasks testing self-
presentation in autism (e.g. Barbaro and Dissanayake 2007; 
Begeer et al. 2008; Scheeren et al. 2010, 2015). Children 
were asked to test three computer games ru  through MAT-
LAB. After playing each game, children were inf rmed that 
other people in Verden had been playing th  game, and a 
leader board was available. Th y were asked if hey would 
like to view their position on the leade  b ard. Unbekn wnst 
to them, their position on the leader board was manipulated, 
such that they either came in first place or in eighth place (out 
of 10 players) on the leader boa d. Leader bo rd position 
was counterbalanced. If children decided to view the leader
board, they were asked whether they would like to save their 
position by making a yes/no judg . It was emphasised 
that saving would mean that others wou d b able to view 
their position on the leader board (Fig. 2). Thus, the depen-
dent variable was decision to save (yes or no).
Theory of Mind (ToM)
ToM was measured using White et al.’s (2009) version of 
the Strange Stories task (Happé 1994). Children saw six 
mental state stories and six nature to ies from White et al.’s 
(2009) battery on-screen. Mental state stori s are desig ed 
to measure mental state understanding while nature stories 
test general story comprehension (White et al. 2009). T  
experimenter read each story aloud and asked the child on  
question related to each story. Answers w re scored 0 for a  
incorrect answer, 1 for a partially correct answer and 2 f r 
a fully correct answer (maximum score 12 points fo  ea h 
story type, mental state or natur ). The dependent variables
were mean scores on mental stat  and nature stori s; higher 
scores reflect better mental state and story comprehension, 
respectively.
Fig. 2 Example trial structure during the explicit reputation task. Children were first given the option to see the leader board, and if they decided 
to do so, they saw their position on the leader board (either first or eighth). They were then asked if they would like to save their score
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as they could. Ten practice trials served to build a prepotent 
response to the football. Next, children were informed that 
they should continue to kick the footballs but not kick any 
rugby balls that appeared. Children completed two blocks 
of 50 trials each (100 trials in total), including 13 rugby 
balls within each block (26 %). The fo tball or rugby ball 
appeared for 200 ms, with a random ISI between 1600 and 
2600 ms between stimuli to ensure they could not predict 
when the stimulus would appear. The dependent variable 
was the child’s mean d’ score calculated across the two 
blocks. d’ was calculated by taking into account the number 
of trials in which children had correctly kicked the football 
(hit rate) and incorrectly kicked the rugby ball (false alarm 
rate). Higher d’ scores reflect better inhibitory control.
Results
Examining Between-Group Differences
Implicit Reputation Task
The observer effect, which quantifies the effect of being 
watched, can be seen in Fig.4. A on -way between-partic-
ipants ANOVA showed that there was no significant group 
difference, F(1, 64) = 2.24, p = .14, ηp2 = 0.034.
by the task. The dependent variables of interest were the 
mean number of points children offered and guessed the 
other would give them (maximum 10 points). All children 
completed 10 trials, with one practice trial t the start.
Expectations of Reciprocity
This task followed a similar struc ur  to the baseli e con-
dition, but children were informed that they would give 
first to the other player, and ere then asked to guess how 
much the other player would give them in return (Fig. 3b). 
The experimenter informed the chi d that the other player
would find out how many points they had been given prior 
to making their decision. This task consisted of ne practice 
trial and 10 experimental trials, and the dependent variables 
were the mean number of points offered and guessed. This 
task examined whether children were aware that the other’s 
response could be contingent upon their own offer.
Inhibitory Control
Inhibitory control was tested with a go/no-go task. Follow-
ing Cragg and Nation (2008), the go/no-go task was pre-
sented in the context of a football game. Children had to 
press the spacebar to “kick” a football very t me it appeared 
on-screen. They were instructed to pr ss the spacebar as fast 
Fig. 3 a Example trial structure of predictions of generosity. Chil-
dren first give points to the other player, and then have to guess how 
many points the other has given to them. b Example trial structure of 
expectations of reciprocity. Children first decided how many points to 
give the other player, and then had to guess how many points the other 
would giv  to them
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and decision to save when top of the leader board, p = .61. 
When bottom of the leader board, 62.5 % of typical chil-
dren and 45.2 % of autistic children did notwant to save
their position. Binomial tests revealed that both groups 
showed no distinct preference for whether they saved their 
score when bottom of the leader board (both ps > 0.22). Chi 
square analysis showed no significant association between 
group and decision to save, χ²(1) = 1.91,p = .18, φ = 0.17.
Theory of Mind
A 2 (group: typical or autism) × 2 (st y type: mental state 
and nature) mixed ANOVA was conducted on Strange Sto-
ries task scores (Table 3). There was a significant main 
effect of group, F(1, 64) = 6.71, = .012, ηp2 = 0.095, with 
children with autism scoring significantly lower on both 
mental state and nature stories. All other main effects and 
interactions were not significant (ps > 0.41). An ANCOVA 
controlling for verbal mental age and gender did not change 
these results, although there was a significant main effect 
of verbal mental age, F(1, 62) = 32.52, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.34.
One sample t tests were used to test whether the observer 
effect was significantly different from zero, which would 
indicate a change in behaviour when observed. For autis-
tic children, there was a significant difference from zero, 
t(32) = −.2.73, p = .01, r =.43, but, as shown in Fig. 4, this 
effect is a negative response to observation. There was 
no significant difference from zero for the typical group, 
t(32) = −0.67, p= .51, r= .12. Exploratory analyses were 
conducted to examine this result. For children with autism, 
correlational analyses revealed a significant correlation 
between the observer effect and scores on the Social Com-
munication Questionnaire (SCQ), r(31) = −0.35, p= .048, 
1-tailed. We had a directional hypothesis that with increas-
ing symptom severity, the observer effect would decrease 
(Fig. 5)
Explicit Reputation Task
In this task, children had the opportunity to protect their rep-
utation. The number of children in each group deciding to 
save their position on the leader board, when it r placed 
top or near the bottom, is s own in Table 2. Some children 
from each group chose not to see the leader b ard a  all: 
when top, one typical child and three autist c children opted 
not to view the leader board. Wh n b ttom, one typical and
two autistic children decided not to view the leader board.
Considering decisions when top of the leader board, 
the majority of typical children (96.9 %) and autistic chil-
dren (93.3%) wanted to save their position. Binomial tests 
showed that both groups were significantly above chance 
for saving when top of the leader board (both ps < 0.001). 
Fisher’s Exact Test showed no association between group 
Table 2 Number of children deciding to save or not to save their 
leader board position depending on whether they appeared top or bot-
tom of the leader board
Position
Top of leader board Bottom of leader 
board
Save? Yes No Yes No
Typical 31 1 12 20
Autism 28 2 17 14
Fig. 5 The relationship between the observer effect and score on the 
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) in the autism group
 
Fig. 4 Box plots showing the distribution of the observer effect (the 
difference score between observed and unobserved conditions), for 
both typical and autism groups. The dotted line represents no differ-
ence between being observed and unobserved (i.e. no observer effect). 
Positive values are indicative of an observer effect
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A 2 (group: typical or autism) × 2 (condition: baseline 
and expectations of reciprocity) × 2 (decision: offer and 
guess) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
decision, F(1, 63) = 6.46, p= .014, ηp2 = 0.093, such that the 
number of points children guessed the other player would 
give them was higher than the number of points they offered. 
There was a significant condition x decision interaction, 
F(1, 63) = 5.25, p= .025, ηp2 = 0.077 and the main effect 
of group approached significance, F(1, 63) = 3.66, p= .06, 
ηp
2 = 0.06, but there were no other significant main effects 
or interactions (all ps > 0.23). To examine the interaction 
between condition and decision, we conducted follow-up 
analyses using repeated-measures t tests. These analyses 
showed only a difference approaching significance between 
guesses at baseline and the expectation of reciprocity condi-
tion, t(64) = 1.95, p= .055, r = .24, such that guesses were 
higher at baseline. An additional ANCOVA controlling for 
verbal mental age (since verbal ability could affect under-
standing of reciprocity) revealed a significant main effect 
of group, F(1, 61) =4.02, p = .05, ηp2 = 0.06, and verbal 
mental age, F(1, 61) = 5.87, p = .018, ηp2 = 0.09, such that 
autistic children tended to both offer and guess more points 
than typical children, and that overall variability could be 
explained by verbal ability.
Inhibitory Control
A MANOVA on the hit and false alarm rates (Table 3) 
showed that there were no significant differences between 
groups in hit rate, F(1, 64) = 0.10, p = .75, ηp2 = 0.002, or 
false alarm rate, F(1, 64) =0.86, p = .34, ηp2 = 0.013. There 
were also no significant difference between groups on d’ 
scores, t(64) = 0.63, p = .53, r= .08.
Social Motivation
Social motivation was measured by asking ch ldren whether 
they would like to play a game with someone or alone. The 
majority of children in each group (typical 61 %, autism
64 %) preferred to play with someone. Chi square confirmed 
that there were no group difference, χ²(1) = 0.80, p =.80, 
φ = 0.11.
The Friendship Motivation Questionnair (Richard 
and Schneider 2005) was also used as a measur  of social
motivation (Table 3). There was no significant difference 
between autistic and typical children in their motivat  for
friendships, t(64) = 0.96, p =.34, r= .12.
Reciprocity
Children’s expectations of reciprocity were teste  by giv-
ing them the opportunity to offer points to others and to 
guess how many points the other would give the  under 
two conditions—a baseline condition (predictions of gener-
osity) and an expectation of reciprocity condition. Figure 6
displays the mean number of po n s offered and gu ssed in 
each of these conditions.
Table 3 Mean (standard deviation) results for the theory of mind, 
social motivation, understanding and expectations of reciprocity, and 
inhibitory control tasks for autistic and typical children
Measure Autism 
(n = 33)
Typical 
(n = 33)
p
value
Theory of mind
Mental state stories
M (SD) 6.79 (3.19)8.58 (1.94)0.008
Range 0–11 2–12
Nature stories
M (SD) 6.88 (3.04)8.12 (2.43)0.059
Range 1–11 2–12
Social motivation
Friendship motivation score
M (SD) 37.03 (5.38)35.82 (4.81)0.34
Range 21–44 23–44
Inhibitory control
Hit rate
M (SD) 92.3 % 
(8.24 %)
93.9 % 
(6.59 %)
0.75
Range 61–100 % 80–100 %
False alarm rate
M (SD) 39.6 % 
(21.1 %)
34.9 % 
(19.6 %)
0.35
Range 4–92 % 8–85 %
d′
M (SD) 1.89 (0.95)2.03 (0.89)0.53
Range 0.08–3.87 −0.27–3.73
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Baseline Expectations Baseline Expectations
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Fig. 6 Mean number of points (maximum 10) offered and guessed 
by both groups according to whether the child was giving at the same 
time (baseline) or giving first (expectations of reciprocity). Error bars 
indicate ±one standard error of the mean
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suggest that autistic children who protected their reputation 
were fairer during the reciprocity tasks.
Discussion
The current study examined whether autistic children 
could implicitly or explicitly manage their reputation and 
the potential processes underpinning such abilities. As pre-
dicted, children with autism did not implicitly manage their 
reputation, and in fact showed a reverse observer effect in 
that they gave fewer points to an anonymous other when 
observed. When reputation was more explicitly at risk, 
some—but not all—autistic children decided to protect their 
reputation. Typical children did not manage their reputation 
in an implicit situation, and there was no difference between 
the groups in terms of explicit reputation management.
Our results partially support previous research testing 
implicit reputation management in autistic children (Che-
vallier et al. 2012b). The methodology of Chevallier et al.’s 
(2012b) study, however, differed markedly to that of the 
current study. Children in their study demonstrated reputa-
tion management by increasing ratings of a drawing that the 
experimenter claimed that she had drawn herself. In the cur-
rent study, children were observed by a third party whilst 
playing dictator games in an online gaming world. Interest-
ingly, typical children were not sensitive to observation in 
our study. This may be due to a protracted development of 
this ability, which may not emerge until adolescence (Blake-
more and Mills 2014) and can be more clearly seen in adult-
hood (e.g. Bateson et al. 2006). Results showed that autistic 
children in fact gave fewer points when observed, and this 
was correlated with their SCQ scores such that with those 
with the greatest degree of autistic features showed weaker 
observer effects. Perhaps autistic children with greater 
symptom severity may have found observation more aver-
sive and thus changed their behaviour. This result is in line 
with previous research suggesting that atypical reactions 
to eye gaze can be related to more severe symptomatology 
(Leekam et al. 1998; Klin et al. 2002).
In the explicit reputation task, in which children had the 
opportunity to protect their reputation, there was a tendency 
for some autistic children to protect their reputation. These 
findings are consistent with research conducted on autistic 
children’s self-presentation skills, which suggests the abil-
ity to present oneself in a certain way is intact (Begeer et al. 
2008; Scheeren et al. 2010,2015). It appears that some autis-
tic children can be aware when their reputation is explicitly 
at stake and they can take a simple step of preventing others 
knowing about this in a computer game. Real-life explicit 
reputation management is likely to be more complicated, 
and indeed Begeer et al. (2008) and Scheeren et al. (2010) 
note that while autistic children can present themselves in 
Examining Individual Differences: Rela onships 
Between Mechanisms and Reputation 
Management
We tested whether there were any relationships between 
performance on the tasks tapping putative mechanisms 
and reputation management in autism and ypical chil ren 
by using correlations and partial correlati ns (contro ling 
for verbal mental age) within each group separately. The 
results of these analyses revealed few significant correla-
tions. The exceptions were significant correlations between 
autistic children’s verbal men al a e and ToM scores 
(r(31) = 0.64, p < .001). For typical children, partial correla-
tions between ToM and friendship motivation were signifi-
cant (r (31) = 0.47, p = .008) as was the co relation between 
explicit reputation management task and fr endship motiva-
tion (r (31) = 0.40, p =.03).
Further exploratory analyses w re conducted since 
explicit reputation management had a binary response as a
dependent variable. We tested wh th r there were an dif-
ferences between children who had decided to say “yes” 
or “no” to saving their position when bottom of the leade
board. There were only significant differences within the 
reciprocity tasks for autistic child en (Table 4). A -
tic children who said “yes” to saving w en bottom of th  
leader board (those who did not protect their reputation) 
made higher offers in the baseline reciprocity condition,
t(29) = 3.17, p= .004, r =.51, and made higher offers in the 
expectations of reciprocity condition, t(29) = 2.18, p = .037, 
r = .38.
One-sample t tests tested whether autistic children dif-
fered significantly from an offer of 5 points, which could 
be considered a fair offer. Autistic children who had said 
“yes” to saving when bottom of the leader board (those less 
concerned about their reputation) made offers significantly 
higher than a fair offer in the baselin  condition, t(16) = 2.32, 
p = .034, r = .50, and in the expectat ons of reciprocity con-
dition, t(16) = 2.94, p = .01, r =.59. There was no difference 
from a fair offer for autistic children who had said “no” 
to saving when bottom of the lead r board. These results 
Table 4 D scriptive statistics for measures of reciprocity which sig-
nificantly differ between autistic children who said “yes” or “no” to 
saving when they came bottom of the leader board
Save when bottom of the 
leader board?
Measure Yes No
Offer when giving at the same time6.12 (1.99)* 4.66
(1.67)
Offer when giving first 6.65 (2.31)**4.26 
(1.78)
*p < .05, **p < .01 for offers significantly different to 5 points
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to be different to how typical children manage reputation. 
Although some of the candidate mechanisms did not relate 
to reputation management, there were some interesting 
group differences in these tasks, which are outlined below.
Our findings concerning social motivation contradict 
the social motivation hypothesis (Chevallier et al. 2012a). 
Children with autism in the current study chose to play with 
someone rather than alone just as much as typical children 
and they expressed a similar degree of motivation for friend-
ships on a questionnaire measure (Richard and Schneider 
2005). These results indicate that autistic children can b
socially motivated, supporting other research that suggests 
that this is the case (Calder et al. 2013; Deckers et al. 2014; 
Ewing et al. 2013; Locke et al. 2010). Second, previous stud-
ies have found mixed and inconsistent results on inhibitory 
control in autism (Christ et al. 2007; Hill 2004a, b; Ozonoff 
and Strayer 1997), and the current study found no difference 
in performance between autistic children and typical chil-
dren in the go/no-go task, supporting the claim that autistic 
individuals do not have difficulties with response inhibition 
(Adams and Jarrold 2012). It is worth noting that the go/
no-go task requires a number of abilities including response 
selection, response inhibition and decision-making (Rubia 
et al. 2001), thus an alternative task, such as the stop-signal 
task, may be more appropriate in future research (Lipszyc 
and Schachar 2010).
Notably, there was a significant group difference on the 
Strange Stories task (Happé 1994; White et al.2009) but 
this group difference was not specific to mental state under-
standing, as performance on nature stories was also sig-
nificantly poorer than typical children. Performance on the 
Strange Stories task was significantly related to verbal abil-
ity, as expected (Happé 1995; Scheeren et al. 2013). These 
results suggest that their performance was more contingent 
on verbal ability and story comprehension rather than a 
specific difficulty with ToM. Regardless of these data, any 
difficulties in ToM in autism may be insufficient to explain 
the social difficulties found in autism (Bennett et al. 2013; 
Pellicano 2013). Indeed, in a review of interventions based 
on ToM there was little evidence that such interventions had 
an impact on real-life social skills (Fletcher-Watson et al. 
2014). To examine further the relationship between reputa-
tion management and ToM, tasks examining both cognitive 
(perspective taking) and affective aspects (emotion under-
standing) (Sebastian et al. 2011) hould be used. It may be 
the case that cognitive ToM contributes more to reputation 
concerns than affective ToM, given the suggestion that cog-
nitive ToM relates more to understanding other’s beliefs (in 
this case, about one’s reputation) (Sebastian et al. 2011).
Whether we expect others to reciprocate could be an 
important mediator for decisions related to reputation man-
agement, for example, when deciding to trust someone (Tanis 
and Postmes 2005). Initial analyses suggested that there were 
a certain light, they do so with less skill—although they 
did not replicate this finding in a larger sample (Scheeren 
et al. 2015) Nonetheless it is important o consider this gap 
between knowledge of reputation and reputatio  manage-
ment in action, supporting the idea that au istic ndividu-
als may be aware of reputation, but struggle w th the social
skills needed to effectively manage it, a finding noted previ-
ously in autistic adults (Cage t al. 2013).
We also tested whether different cognitive processes 
might determine the degree to which children with autism 
engage in reputation management. Scores on tasks designed 
to measure individual differences in he candidate mecha-
nisms, however, were unrela ed to ind vidual differences in 
implicit reputation management. Further analyses, however, 
revealed potentially interesting di ferences within the group 
of autistic children—between those who had protected their 
reputation and those who had not, offering potential expla-
nations for why some but not all autistic children managed
their reputation. Specifically, autistic children who protected 
their reputation made fairer offers in the r ciprocity task. It 
may be the case that those with a more sensitive appreciation 
of fairness are also more sensitive to the  reputation when it 
is explicitly at risk. This finding supports previous research, 
which has suggested that understanding and xpectations 
of reciprocity may contribute to reputation management in 
autism (Cage et al. 2013). Further, our results suggest that 
autistic children, like their typical peers, may us  fairness 
as a signal to others (Shaw 2013; Shaw et al. 2014). Fair-
ness is an important motivator o  behaviour, e p cially in 
economic games (Fehr and Gäch er 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 
1999) and the current findings support research which dem-
onstrates that autistic children have explicit wareness of 
social norms such as equal  or fairness Schmitz t al. 
2014). Indeed, Scheeren et al. (2010) claim that a ti tic 
individuals may be less effective in self-presenta ion due to 
an increased likelihood of sticking t  no m —and thus they 
avoid self-presentational te hn ques uch a  lying or boast-
ing to boost their reputation. Thus, learn ng about norms and 
social rules may contribute to v riability in expl cit reputa-
tion management in autism. However, caution is warranted 
in the interpretation of this result since these analyses were 
post-hoc in nature. Nevertheless, they do highlight interes-
ing hypotheses for future research. Such research should 
also consider other alternative xplana ions for why not all
autistic children explicitly mana e reputation—such as the 
impact of social anxiety.
Conversely, we found that f r typical children, social 
motivation was related to explicit reputation management, 
such that those who reported a higher friendship motiva-
tion score were more likely to p ot ct their reputa ion. 
This mechanism did not impact upon reput ion manage-
ment for autistic children. These findings suggest that how 
autistic children come to manage their reputation is lik ly 
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autism (e.g. Calder et al. 2013; Deckers et al. 2014; Ewing
et al. 2013; Locke et al. 2010). Our findings present fur-
ther evidence for potential social capacity in autism. Future 
research should examine the development of this capacity in 
adolescence, especially since qualitative evidence suggests 
that autistic adolescents can be concerned about their repu-
tation (Cage et al. 2016) and dolescence appears to be a 
pertinent time for reputation concerns in typical individuals 
(Blakemore and Mills 2014). Fina ly, although the current 
study did not find gender differences within any of the tasks, 
future research would benefit from a larger female sample to 
test for any potential gender differences, particularly given 
the suggestion that autistic girls may be better at “camou-
flaging” or “masking” (Head et al. 2014) and therefore cog-
nizant of how others’ might perceive them.
Overall, the current study supported the hypothesis that 
some autistic children can manage their reputation explic-
itly, but not implicitly. Our results suggest that autistic 
children may be less susceptible to being automatically or 
subconsciously influenced by other people, but they are not 
immune to explicit awareness that their behaviour could 
be judged by others. However, there were individual dif-
ferences in explicit reputation management in autism, with 
some, but not all, autistic children taking steps to influ-
ence what others know about them. The current findings 
also highlight that the ability to manage reputation explic-
itly may be underpinned by different mechanisms in typi-
cal and in autistic children. Further research is required to 
strengthen our understanding of reputation management in 
autism, and to examine alternative hypotheses.
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no differences in expectations of r ciprocity betwee  autistic 
and typical children, with both groups tending to have high 
predictions of generosity (such that they guess d the other 
would give them more points than they thems lves were pr-
pared to give) and then adjusting this when the possibility of 
reciprocity was introduced, sugges ng th t they were war
that the other’s response would be contingent on their own 
offer. However, after controlling for verbal abili y, autistic 
children gave significantly more points overall, and verbal 
mental age accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
the number of points given, s ggesting that v rbal ability may 
impact on expectations of reciprocity. It may be the case that 
those with better verbal ability ar  more adept at understand-
ing social norms (such as recip oc ty), which re ought to 
have evolved precisely because of language (Smith 2010), 
and thus expectations could b  related to th  knowledge and 
experience of these norms (Hoffman et al. 2008).
Limitations and Future Dire t ons
This study is not without its limi ations. It is possible that 
the tasks used were not sufficiently sensitive to detect poten-
tial differences between autistic and ty ical children. The 
Strange Stories task (Happé 1994) is frequently used o
measure second-order ToM (e.g. W i et al. 2009), yet was 
only related to differences in children’s l nguage ability. 
The go/no-go task has also previously found mixed results 
(Adams and Jarrold 2012; Christ et al. 2007; Hil  2004a). 
Previous research utilising economic games to test social 
decision-making in autistic childre  have also shown lit le 
difference between typical and autistic children (Downs and 
Smith 2004; Sally and Hill 2006), although rece t r se ch 
suggests that children with autism may have different norm 
preferences (Schmitz et al. 2014). Therefore, one w ul  
expect there to be individua  differences wit in the various 
tasks, which indeed we found. However, only variabi ity 
in friendship motivation contributed to explicit reputation 
management, and only in typical children. With regard to 
the sensitivity of our implic t reputatio  ma ag ment task, 
again, we found great individual differences within this
task. Similar implicit tasks have bee  used in dult popula-
tions (Cage et al. 2013; Izuma et al. 2011) suggesting that 
the task is valid, but over the course of development chil-
dren may become more aware that their reputation at stake 
in this task. Thus, future research would benefit from testing 
implicit reputation management in adolescents to examine 
its developmental trajectory.
Understanding autistic individual’s concern for repu-
tation has implications for how autism is viewed—some 
autistic individuals can be concerned bout how hey are 
seen in the eyes of others and we should take this into con-
sideration, for example in th  classroom. This suggestion 
also corroborates research demonstrating social interest in 
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